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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jorge Ferreira Tinoco appeals from his judgments of conviction for trafficking in 
methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance, contending the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss because of an alleged speedy trial 
violation. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Tinoco was indicted by the grand jury for the offenses of trafficking in 
methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance. (R., Vol. I, pp.16-17.) 
Tinoco was arraigned on the indictment on April 15, 2011, and asserted his right to have 
a speedy trial. (R., Vol. I, pp.24-25.) Jury trial was originally scheduled for July 6, 2011 
but reset for August 16, 2011 because the grand jury transcript had not yet been 
prepared. (R., Vol. I, pp.30-31.) At a hearing on whether Tinoco should be tried with 
his co-defendant, the district court took the issue under advisement and vacated the trial 
date and reset the trial for September 20, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.60-61.) The court 
granted ultimately ordered a joint trial. (R., Vol. I, pp.66-74.) 
Jury trial commenced on September 20, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.82-93 (minutes 
from day one of the jury trial).) Before commencing the second day of trial, defense 
counsel f0t Tinoco's co-defendant made a motion for mistrial because the trial court 
erred by failing to consider the defense's Batson objection before swearing the jury. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.94-96.) On day two of the jury trial, counsel for Tinoco joined the motion 
for mistrial which was ultimately granted by the court. (R., Vol. I, p.96; 9/21/11 Tr., p.34, 
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Ls.21-22.) A new trial date was set, without objection, for November 1, 2011. 
(9/21/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.22-23.) 
Tinoco filed a motion to dismiss for an alleged violation of his speedy trial rights 
on October 24, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.129-133.) Following a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion to dismiss finding there had been "compliance with Idaho Code 19-
3501 in that the matter was brought to trial" (10/31/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.11-13), and that 
there was "good cause" for not holding the trial within six months (10/31/11 Tr., p.36, 
L.12). 
Tinoco was retried and a jury found him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine 
and delivery of a controlled substance. (R., Vol. 11, pp.215-216.) The court imposed a 
unified sentence of 23 years with the first 10 years determinate on the trafficking 
conviction and a concurrent unified sentence of 15 years with the first five years fixed on 




Tinoco states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Tinoco's motion to dismiss because 
the delay in bringing him to trial violated the speedy trial guarantee 
protected by I.C. § 19-5301, the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Tinoco failed to show any error in the district court's conclusion that there was no 
violation of Tinoco's statutory or constitutional rights to a speedy trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
Tinoco Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion He Failed To Show 
A Violation Of His Speedy Trial Rights 
A. Introduction 
Tinoco's case was brought to trial within the speedy trial limits. (See R., Vol. I, 
pp.16-18 (filing of superceding indictment on April 7, 2011), pp.24-25 (arraignment on 
superceding indictment on April 15, 2011 ), pp.82-93 (September 21, 2011 minutes of 
first day of jury trial).) The district court declared a mistrial upon Tinoco's motion 
following the selection and swearing in of a jury and reset the jury trial for November 1, 
2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.94-97; 9/21/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.21-23.) Although there was no 
objection made to the new trial date, Tinoco filed a motion to dismiss for a speedy trial 
violation on October 24, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.129-133.) The district court concluded 
that there had been no violation of Tinoco's constitutional or statutory speedy trial rights. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.142-143; 10/31/2011 Tr., p.29, L.11 - p.34, L.5.) Tinoco argues that the 
district court erred. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-8.) Application of the law to the facts as 
found by the district court, however, shows that Tinoco has failed to carry his burden of 
showing error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 
931,933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,852,153 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Ct. App. 
2006). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact that are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews the trial court's application of 
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the law to the facts found. Avila, 143 Idaho at 852, 153 P.3d at 1198, State v. Davis, 
141 Idaho 828,835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. Tinoco's Statutory Speedy Trial Violation Claim Is Without Merit 
Tinoco was entitled to dismissal without prejudice if he was not tried within six 
months of his arraignment on the superceding indictment and there was not "good 
cause" for delay. I.C. §§ 19-3501(3), 19-3506. Tinoco was in fact brought to trial within 
the six months of his arraignment. Tinoco's jury trial commenced on September 20, 
2011 with a jury sworn before the district court granted a defense motion for mistrial on 
September 21. This was over three weeks before Tinoco's speedy trial ran. Tinoco 
argues that "the district court's error in misleading counsel regarding the timing of the 
Batson challenge does not justify setting the trial outside the speedy trial period." 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) Tinoco argues that because there was no good cause for the 
shown for the delay in trial, "the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss 
regardless of whether the additional Barker factors also weigh towards dismissal." (Id.) 
The statute does not require a trial must go to verdict within six months of 
arraignment. Interpreting the statute to contemplate a retrial after a mistrial must be 
held within six months of arraignment is outside the plain meaning of the text of the 
statute. Because Tinoco was brought to trial within the statutory six months, there was 
no speedy trial violation. 
D. Tinoco Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion He Failed To 
Show A Violation Of His Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights 
Even if Tinoco's trial date following the mistrial declared in his first trial 
constituted a delay of his speedy trial, there was good cause shown for such delay. 
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"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to speedy trial." State v. 
Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 2007). When analyzing 
claims of speedy trial violations under the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho 
appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). State v. Young, 136 Idaho 
113,117, 29 P.3d 949,953 (2001); Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1288; State v. 
Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 853, 153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be 
considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 
defendant's assertion of his or her right to speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned 
by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Application of this legal standard to the facts 
found by the district court shows that Tinoco's claim of error fails. 
1. The Length Of The Delay Is Neither Sufficient To Trigger Balancing Nor 
Does It Weigh In Tinoco's Favor 
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is 
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the 
other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. For purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the date there is 'a formal 
indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to 
answer a criminal charge.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United 
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,320 (1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.) 
"Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date 
formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." Lopez, 
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144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Once the balancing test is 
triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of itself. Avila, 143 Idaho at 
853, 153 P.3d at 1199. 
The delay in this case did not trigger any presumption of prejudice. In Doggett v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992), the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that this factor required a "double enquiry." The first enquiry is whether "the interval 
between accusation and trial" had become "presumptively prejudicial." & This part of 
the enquiry is necessary because a defendant may not claim that the government has 
denied him of a speedy trial if the government "has, in fact, prosecuted his case with 
customary promptness." & The Court stated in a footnote that pretrial delay therefore 
does not generally trigger speedy trial enquiry until it "at least ... approaches one year." 
kl at 652 n.1. Here the time between arraignment on the indictment trial was less than 
seven months, a period of time insufficient to trigger the presumption of prejudice. 
Even if the threshold enquiry had been met here, Tinoco has failed to show that 
bringing him to trial in less than seven months weighs in favor of finding a violation of 
speedy trial rights. Bringing Tinoco to trial less than seven months after his arraignment 
simply does create much, if any, presumption of prejudice. 
2. The Granting Of A Mistrial Constituted A Valid Reason For The Brief 
Delay 
Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial 
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly 
justifiable." Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656); 
State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that 
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reason, different weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 
U.S. at 531. As explained by the Supreme Court: 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense 
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral 
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted 
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate 
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather 
than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing 
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. 
kl at 531 (footnote omitted). In this case the 41 day delay engendered by granting of a 
mistrial was appropriate because it was based a trial error. 
The district court set forth the undisputed facts relevant to the speedy trial issue 
as follows: 
As a factual basis, generally, the Court finds that on April 15th , 
2011, the defendant was - and I'm referring to Mr. Tinoco, because Mr. 
Tinoco's the one who has stood on his speedy trial rights in this base. But 
he was arraigned on two felony drug offenses. He was charged by 
superseding [sic] indictment in this case. Count 1 charges him with 
trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine. Count 2 charged him 
with delivery of a controlled substance. To this charge, Mr. Tinoco plead 
[sic] not guilty, and specifically asserted his rights to have a speedy trial. 
The trial was originally scheduled for August 15th , 2011. That trial 
was continued and reset within the speedy trial period. Trial setting, 
again, September 21 5\ 2011 are the reason, at least obvious on the 
record, for resetting the trials, because I believe when these matters first 
came to trial, they were not consolidated, and there were some issues that 
arose on that date. Then there was a motion to consolidate on or about 
that date. And ultimately, this Court decided to consolidate, and then 
subsequently denied a motion to sever the trials. 
The motion to consolidate was on or about July 25th , 2011. The 
August 15th , 2011 trial was vacated and a new jury trial was scheduled for 
September 20th ; is that - am I - I've been saying September 20th first [sic], 
but is it September 20th? I guess the trial was commenced on September 
20th , 2011 . So the record needs to be corrected to reflect it was the 
September 20th , 2011 trial. The status conference was September 1 gt\ 
2011. So I'll correct the record to reflect the jury trial at issue was 
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scheduled to commence September 20th , 2011, and that is the date that 
the issues of the multiple Batson - the Batson challenge arose. 
Judge Morfitt ruled that the Batson challenge was not properly 
raised prior to the jury being sworn, but accepted responsibility as the 
Court for, perhaps, creating uncertainty or confusion, acknowledging that 
the attorneys advised him of their Batson challenge off the record, and 
that he had, basically, indicated he wanted to get the jury taken care of, or 
something to that effect, which he went ahead and seated the jury, and 
excused the other jurors while the attorneys were still waiting, I believe, to 
address the Batson issues. 
Thereafter, Mr. Sisson [counsel for Tinoco's co-defendant] made a 
motion for a mistrial, and Mr. Briggs [counsel for Tinoco] joined in that 
motion for a mistrial. Court acknowledged it potentially misled defense 
counsel outside the courtroom, and a a result of that, declared a mistrial 
accepting responsibility for that problem. The Court set a new trial date 
for November 1st, 2011. The record, as far as my review, indicates the -
neither the Court nor either attorney indicated on the record at that time 
that the November 1st, 2011 date was not within the speedy trial date, 
which was October 1ih, 2011, according to this Court's calculation. The 
new trial setting, which is for tomorrow, November 1st, 2011, exceeds the 
- or goes beyond the original set speedy trial date of October 1ih, 2011, 
appears 18 days. 
(10/31/11 Tr., p.24, L.23 - p.27, L.14.) Regarding the mistrial, the district court 
concluded: "I do not find it was delay caused by the State or Defense in this case, but, 
in fact, the Court." (10/31/11 Tr., p.32, Ls.9-11.) These findings more than support the 
district court's determination that the mistrial was based on a valid reason, and therefore 
any attendant delay was also reasonable. 
3. Although Tinoco Asserted His Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights At The 
Time Of His Arraignment, He Did Not Object To The District Court's Trial 
Setting Following The Granting Of His Motion For A Mistrial 
The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant asserted 
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his right is "entitled 
to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of 
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the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171. 
"Failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was 
denied a speedy trial." Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P .3d at 171. Although Tinoco 
asserted his speedy trial rights upon his arraignment on the indictment, he did not object 
to the mistrial or the trial setting in the new trial. Tinoco did not complain of a potential 
speedy trial violation until he filed a motion to dismiss on October 24, 2011, 33 days 
after the mistrial and scheduling of the new trial. (R. Vol. I, pp.129-133.) As the district 
court found, "when balanced and compared to the reason for the continued trial and the 
time delay involved, ... it's [not] an overriding factor either way." (10/31/11 Tr., p.32, 
L.24 - p.33, L.2.) Thus, this factor does not weigh heavily in Tinoco's favor. 
4. Tinoco Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Prejudiced By The Delay 
The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature and 
extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. Barker, 407 
U.S. at 532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 
P.3d at 172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants which 
the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those interests are (1) to 
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize anxiety and 
concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will 
be impaired. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Accord 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 854, 153 P.3d at 
1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. "The third of these is the most 
significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense 'skews the 
fairness of the entire system."' Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P. 3d at 1290 ( citing 
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Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 990 P.2d 742, 749 
(Ct. App. 1999)). 
Although Tinoco was in custody the entire time the charges were pending, he 
made no claim below that the delay from his arrest in any way prejudiced his ability to 
defend himself at trial except to assert at the motion hearing that the state's case got 
stronger with the recently completed fingerprint analysis on evidence pointing to the 
culpability of Tinoco. (10/31/2011 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-17.) There is no assertion that the trial 
was in way delayed to obtain such forensic results, just that the testing only became 
complete after the mistrial. (10/31/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.10-19.) As noted by the district 
court, this is not the "kind of prejudice that was contemplated in the cases dealing with 
this issue." (10/31/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-5.) The only relevant prejudice found by the 
district court was pre-trial incarceration. (10/31/2011 Tr., p.33, Ls.3-18.) Pre-trial 
incarceration, alone, does not cause this factor to weigh in Tinoco's favor. 
5. A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A 
Speedy Trial Violation 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, must be 
balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a speedy trial was 
violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case the time from arraignment to trial was 
relatively short. It was not enough to trigger speedy trial analysis. Even if enough to act 
as a trigger, it was only barely enough. That the delay was minimal weighs heavily in 
favor of the district court's ruling. The reason for delay also strongly supports the 
determination that there was no speedy trial violation because the only delay 
complained of was due to granting of Tinoco's motion for a mistrial. The third factor 
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also does not weigh heavily in Tinoco's favor because, although Tinoco did assert his 
right early on, he failed to object to the new trial date. Finally, there was minimal 
prejudice. This final factor ultimately weighs in favor of the district court's ruling. 
Because these factors weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation, Tinoco has 
failed to show error in the denial of his motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Tinoco's judgments of 
conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine and deli ery of a controlled substance. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of May 2013 caused a true an 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Robyn Fyffe 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
NLS/rn 
12 
